Negotiator Cognitions: A Descriptive Approach to Negotiators' Understanding of Their Opponents

Abstract Substantial evidence exists that negotiators frequently fail to attain readily available and mutually beneficial outcomes. This paper provides a preliminary model of why these failures occur. We assume that negotiators are decision makers, and that their errors derive from cognitive processes ignored by utility-maximization theories. We focus on one part of the model: the systematic tendency to ignore the cognitions of opponent negotiators. Empirical evidence clarifying negotiators' cognitive processes is generated using verbal protocol techniques in a controlled negotiation task. The results show that subjects simplify the negotiation task, in part by ignoring contingencies introduced by the knowledge possessed by their opponents. The discussion focuses on how subjects simplify the task and how the decision-making perspective helps redirect the negotiation literature.

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