VMV: Augmenting an Internet Voting System with Selene Verifiability

Online voting in the UK generally takes place without verifiability mechanisms, with providers that are trusted to provide ballot privacy and correctness of the result. However, replacing existing systems with verifiable voting systems with brand new algorithms and code presents a business risk to election providers. We present an approach for incremental change: adding a Selene-based verifiability layer to an existing online voting system. Selene is a verifiable e-voting protocol that publishes votes in plaintext alongside tracking numbers that enable voters to confirm that their votes have been captured correctly by the system. This results in a system where even the election authority running the system cannot change the result in an undetectable way. This gives stronger guarantees on the integrity of the election than were previously present. This gives an end-to-end verifiable system we call Verify My Vote (VMV). In addition, we outline how this approach supports further incremental changes towards the deployment of fully trustworthy online voting systems. The paper also describes the use of distributed ledger technology as a component of VMV to manage the verifiability data in a decentralised way for resilience and trust.

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