The Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission's Blended Retirement Plan: Implications for Marine Corps Force Management Objectives

Abstract : This report examines the impact of the new military blended retirement system (BRS) on various U.S. Marine Corps force management objectives (FMOs). We estimated the effect of the retirement system changes on active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) force profiles and personnel costs and the financial impact on individual AC Marines. Our results depend on assumptions about personal discount, BRS opt-in, Thrift Savings Plan contribution, and return-on-investment rates. Our baseline estimates of the effects on FMOs use the assumptions in the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) final report. We tested the sensitivity of our estimates to changes in the MCRMC assumptions and found that enlisted force profiles change very little, while enlisted personnel cost saving estimates are more varied. Our long-run annual AC enlisted personnel cost saving estimates range from $87 million to $225 million. Estimates for AC officer FMOs are more sensitive to changes in the assumptions. AC officer personnel cost savings range from $10 million to $54 million. RC enlisted and officer personnel cost savings are in the respective ranges of $0.2 million to $5 million and -$0.3 million to$1.5 million.

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