Propensity, Probability, and Quantum Theory

Quantum mechanics and probability theory share one peculiarity. Both have well established mathematical formalisms, yet both are subject to controversy about the meaning and interpretation of their basic concepts. Since probability plays a fundamental role in QM, the conceptual problems of one theory can affect the other. We first classify the interpretations of probability into three major classes: (a) inferential probability, (b) ensemble probability, and (c) propensity. Class (a) is the basis of inductive logic; (b) deals with the frequencies of events in repeatable experiments; (c) describes a form of causality that is weaker than determinism. An important, but neglected, paper by P. Humphreys demonstrated that propensity must differ mathematically, as well as conceptually, from probability, but he did not develop a theory of propensity. Such a theory is developed in this paper. Propensity theory shares many, but not all, of the axioms of probability theory. As a consequence, propensity supports the Law of Large Numbers from probability theory, but does not support Bayes theorem. Although there are particular problems within QM to which any of the classes of probability may be applied, it is argued that the intrinsic quantum probabilities (calculated from a state vector or density matrix) are most naturally interpreted as quantum propensities. This does not alter the familiar statistical interpretation of QM. But the interpretation of quantum states as representing knowledge is untenable. Examples show that a density matrix fails to represent knowledge.

[1]  T. Fine Theories of Probability: An Examination of Foundations , 1973 .

[2]  Diederik Aerts,et al.  Operational Quantum Mechanics, Quantum Axiomatics and Quantum Structures , 2008, Compendium of Quantum Physics.

[3]  R. T. Cox The Algebra of Probable Inference , 1962 .

[4]  K. Popper The Propensity Interpretation of Probability , 1959 .

[5]  R. T. Cox Probability, frequency and reasonable expectation , 1990 .

[6]  R. Tumulka The Assumptions of Bell's Proof , 2015, 1501.04168.

[7]  T. Norsen John S. Bell’s concept of local causality , 2007, 0707.0401.

[8]  Leslie E Ballentine,et al.  Probability theory in quantum mechanics , 1986 .

[9]  E. T. Jaynes,et al.  Clearing up Mysteries — The Original Goal , 1989 .

[10]  Christopher S. I. Mccurdy Humphrey's paradox and the interpretation of inverse conditional propensities , 2004, Synthese.

[11]  J. Pearl Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference , 2000 .

[12]  Paul Humphreys,et al.  Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities , 1985, Philosophical Papers.

[13]  H. Araki,et al.  Measurement of Quantum Mechanical Operators , 1960 .

[14]  Karl Raimund Sir Popper,et al.  Realism and the aim of science , 1983 .

[15]  O. Penrose Foundations of statistical mechanics , 1969 .

[16]  Alfréd Rényi,et al.  Foundations of Probability , 1971 .

[17]  L. Ballentine Quantum mechanics : a modern development , 1998 .

[18]  E. Jaynes Probability theory : the logic of science , 2003 .

[19]  Objective and Subjective Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics , 2007, 0710.5945.

[20]  Leslie E Ballentine,et al.  Limitations of the projection postulate , 1990 .

[21]  L. E. Ballentine Interpretations of Probability and Quantum Theory , 2001 .

[22]  J. Bell,et al.  Speakable and Unspeakable in Quatum Mechanics , 1988 .

[23]  K. Popper,et al.  The Logic of Scientific Discovery , 1960 .

[24]  E. Wigner Die Messung quantenmechanischer Operatoren , 1952 .

[25]  Donald Gillies,et al.  Varieties of Propensity , 2000, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

[26]  K. Matthes RÉNYI, A.: Foundations of Probability. Holden‐Day, Inc., San Francisco 1970. XVI, 366 S., $ 20,00. , 1973 .

[27]  T. Ohira,et al.  Perfect disturbing measurements , 1988 .

[28]  Against ‘Realism’ , 2006, quant-ph/0607057.