Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations

We study the problem of a budget limited buyer who wants to buy a set of items, each from a different seller, to maximize her value. The budget feasible mechanism design problem requires the design a mechanism which incentivizes the sellers to truthfully report their cost and maximizes the buyer’s value while guaranteeing that the total payment does not exceed her budget. Such budget feasible mechanisms can model a buyer in a crowdsourcing market interested in recruiting a set of workers (sellers) to accomplish a task for her.

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