Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Eric Balkanski,et al. Bayesian Budget Feasibility with Posted Pricing , 2015, WWW.
[2] James A. Hendler,et al. Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web , 2016, WWW.
[3] Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al. Mechanisms for complement-free procurement , 2011, EC '11.
[4] Ning Chen,et al. Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian , 2012, STOC '12.
[5] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..
[6] Gagan Goel,et al. Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets , 2014, 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[7] Andreas Krause,et al. Incentives for Privacy Tradeoff in Community Sensing , 2013, HCOMP.
[8] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce , 2011, EC 2011.
[9] Gerhard J. Woeginger,et al. Operations Research Letters , 2011 .
[10] Maxim Sviridenko,et al. A note on maximizing a submodular set function subject to a knapsack constraint , 2004, Oper. Res. Lett..
[11] Ning Chen,et al. On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms , 2010, SODA '11.
[12] Evangelos Markakis,et al. Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design , 2016, WINE.
[13] Samir Khuller,et al. The Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem , 1999, Inf. Process. Lett..
[14] Robert M Thrall,et al. Mathematics of Operations Research. , 1978 .
[15] Gagan Goel,et al. Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing Markets with Heterogeneous Tasks , 2014, HCOMP.
[16] Yaron Singer,et al. Budget Feasible Mechanisms , 2010, 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[17] Evangelos Markakis,et al. On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives , 2017, WINE.