A Game Theoretical Approach to Defend Against Co-Resident Attacks in Cloud Computing: Preventing Co-Residence Using Semi-Supervised Learning

While cloud computing has facilitated easy and affordable access to IT resources, it has also introduced a wide range of security risks from almost every layer and component of cloud systems. In this paper, we focus on one risk at the virtual machine level and the co-resident attack, where by constructing various types of side channels, malicious users can obtain sensitive information from other virtual machines that co-locate on the same physical server. Most previous work has focused on the elimination of side channels, or more generally speaking, the possible countermeasures after attackers co-locate with their targets. In contrast, we provide a different perspective, and propose a defence mechanism that makes it difficult and expensive for attackers to achieve co-residence in the first place. Specifically, we first identify the potential differences between the behaviors of attackers and legal users. Second, we apply clustering analysis and semi-supervised learning techniques to classify users. Third, we model the problem as a two-player security game, and give a detailed analysis of the optimum strategies for both players. Finally, we demonstrate that the attacker's overall cost is increased dramatically by one-to-two orders of magnitude as a result of our defence mechanism.