Investigating rejection behavior in the ultimatum game as a measure of anthropomorphism

In this work I investigate the possibility of using rejection behavior in the Ultimatum Game as a measure of anthropomorphism. Other measures of anthropomorphism have been suggested, mostly in the form of surveys. These, however, capture only one aspect of anthropomorphism: users’ rational and conscious ideas about a piece of technology. More implicit measures are needed to assess users’ subconscious and behavioral responses to the technology. Literature indicates that in the Ultimatum Game players are willing to incur a cost to themselves to punish (by rejecting an offer) another player for unfair behavior. In order to examine if and how UG behavior could serve as a measure of anthropomorphism, I have investigated how human receivers respond to robotic players in the UG and how this relates to the way they respond to computer and human players. The results of this study show that responses to human, robotic and computer players do not differ significantly. This in contrast to earlier findings that computer offers are rejected less often than offers from a human opponent. This difference may have been caused by the methodologies used: in the other studies, subjects were deliberately put into a less anthropomorphic mindset when they played against computer opponents. In the current study, the instructions were the same for all types of opponents. UG rejection behavior, then, seems to vary with the level of anthropomorphism, which suggests that it can indeed be used as a measure of anthropomorphism. In addition, results show that although subjects claim that they see computers and robots as less intentional and responsible than humans, these attitudes are not reflected in their behavior toward robots and computers in the Ultimatum Game. This supports the idea that self-reported anthropomorphism is not the same as implicit anthropomorphism. Implications for HRI and HCI practice are discussed.

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