Differential Side Channel Analysis Attacks on FPGA Implementations of ARIA

This paper has investigated the susceptibility of an FPGA implementation of a block cipher against side channel analysis attacks. We have performed DPA attacks and DEMA attacks (in the nea. and far field) on an FPGA implementation of ARIA which has been implemented into two architectures of S-box. Although the number of needed traces for a successful attack is increased when compared with existing results on smart cards, we have shown that ARIA without countermeasures is indeed very susceptible to side channel analysis attacks regardless of an architecture of S-box.

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