A Random Graph Model of Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchanges I

In kidney paired donation, incompatible patient-donor pairs are matched with other pairs, with each patient receiving a kidney from another patient’s donor. The multi-hospital kidney exchange problem arises when the patientdonor lists of multiple hospitals are pooled into a single exchange program, and hospitals can decide which pairs to reveal to the exchange and which to keep for internal matches. Modeling the problem as one of nding maximum matchings on a random graph, we

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