SATMC: A SAT-Based Model Checker for Security-Critical Systems

We present SATMC 3.0, a SAT-based bounded model checker for security-critical systems that stems from a successful combination of encoding techniques originally developed for planning with techniques developed for the analysis of reactive systems. SATMC has been successfully applied in a variety of application domains (security protocols, security-sensitive business processes, and cryptographic APIs) and for different purposes (design-time security analysis and security testing). SATMC strikes a balance between general purpose model checkers and security protocol analyzers as witnessed by a number of important success stories including the discovery of a serious man-in-the-middle attack on the SAML-based Single Sign-On (SSO) for Google Apps, an authentication flaw in the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile, and a number of attacks on PKCS#11 Security Tokens. SATMC is integrated and used as back-end in a number of research prototypes (e.g., the AVISPA Tool, Tookan, the SPaCIoS Tool) and industrial-strength tools (e.g., the Security Validator plugin for SAP NetWeaver BPM).

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