The Importance of Bank Seniority for Relationship Lending

The authors examine two aspects of a bank's interaction with its borrowers--the relative priority of bank debt and the role of banks as "relationship lenders." They show that making the bank senior improves its incentives to build a relationship with the firm, thereby fulfilling an important function of intermediated debt.

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