Frequency as a nonpropositional attribute of memory.

If frequency has a privileged, analog memory representation, as multiple-trace theory assumes, then at retrieval, it should not be confused with other quantitative information. If it shares a common associative or propositional format with other information, then such confusions should occur. In Experiment 1, subjects studied picture—digit pairs. The digits were 1–5, and the pairs were shown 1–5 times, in a 5 × 5 within-list design. Judged frequencies of the pictures were fairly accurate, and showed no intrusions from the digits. Digit recall showed frequency intrusions only for subjects who had given overt frequency judgments first. In Experiment 2, frequency information was communicated to the subjects verbally. Recall of stated frequency was poor, and showed mutual interference with the digit associates. The findings suggest that while frequency can be represented propositionally, it is automatically encoded, from direct experience with repetitions, in analog form.

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