Experiments in Executive Government under MMP in New Zealand: Contrasting Approaches to Multi-party Governance

As expected, the advent of proportional representation in New Zealand has witnessed the formation of a series of multi-party governments. Thus far, most of these have lacked an absolute parliamentary majority. Distinctive, if not unorthodox, inter-party arrangements have been a feature of some of these governments. Such arrangements have resulted from the desire to manage inter-party dissent and, in particular, to maximise governmental effectiveness while at the same time protecting the identity and distinctiveness of the parties involved (and hence their electoral viability). We refer to this as the 'unity-distinctiveness' dilemma. This article explores the contrasting approaches to multi-party governance adopted since the mid 1990s in New Zealand. In so doing, we consider the options available regarding the form and 'tightness' of inter-party discipline and their respective strengths and weaknesses. Particular attention is given to the development of 'agree to disagree' provisions in coalition agreements and the 'hybrid' arrangements negotiated in both 2005 and 2008 enabling minor parties to participate in the executive while not being a part of the Cabinet. We argue that while these arrangements may have facilitated more durable and less fractious government, they do not appear to have assisted the various minor parties that have participated within the executive to maintain their electoral base. Necessarily such arrangements have required modifications to the application of the convention of collective responsibility, especially the principle of Cabinet unanimity or solidarity. These modifications appear to have been reasonably well accepted across the political spectrum - highlighted by the decision of the National-led Government in November 2008 to embrace similar governance arrangements to those adopted by the previous Labour-led Government.