Policy modes, firms and the natural environment

This paper examines how different environmental policy types differentially impact firms and why firms vary in their responses to such policies. Based on the mechanisms embedded in policy instruments to create incentives for firms to comply, the characteristics of benefits/costs that policies impose on firms and the institutional context in which policy instruments were created and are sustained, the paper identifies five policy categories. These are category I (command and control), category II (market based), category III (mandatory information disclosures), category IV (business–government partnerships) and category V (private voluntary codes). Different policy types often bestow asymmetrical benefits/costs on firms. Some benefits/costs may constitute ‘private/club goods’ while others may constitute ‘public goods’. Drawing insights from public policy literature, the paper argues that firms can be expected to favor policies whose benefits have the characteristics of private/club goods but the costs of public goods. Thus, understanding the nature of benefits/costs (private/club versus public) and the magnitude of their excludability is critical in explaining the variations in firms' responses. To understand how managers perceive the nature of benefits/costs (monetary as well as non-monetary), the paper draws on theories and perspectives in the business and public policy field. In doing so, the paper examines the ‘demand’ and the ‘supply’ sides as well as the market and non-market environments of a given policy. Thus, the paper makes a case for a multi-theoretic approach to understand variations in managerial assessments of benefits/costs, and consequently variations in their responses to various policy types. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

[1]  Daniel J. Fiorino Rethinking environmental regulation: perspectives on law and governance , 1999 .

[2]  Chad Nehrt,et al.  Maintainability of First Mover Advantages When Environmental Regulations Differ Between Countries , 1998 .

[3]  J. Hamilton Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data , 1995 .

[4]  H. William Vroman,et al.  Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector , 1994 .

[5]  Noan Walley,et al.  It's not easy being green , 1994 .

[6]  Cary Coglianese,et al.  Regulating from the inside , 2001 .

[7]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Public Goods and Public Choices , 2019, Alternatives for Delivering Public Services.

[8]  Charles F. Sabel,et al.  After Backyard Environmentalism , 2000 .

[9]  Robert A. Kagan,et al.  Adversarial legalism and American government , 1991 .

[10]  Tom Tietenberg,et al.  Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy , 1985 .

[11]  Ronald K. Mitchell,et al.  Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of who and What Really Counts , 1997 .

[12]  Tom Tietenberg,et al.  Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control , 1998 .

[13]  R. Kagan,et al.  Adversarial Legalism and Transaction Costs: The Industrial Flight Hypothesis Revisited , 2000 .

[14]  Shameek Konar,et al.  Information As Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions , 1997 .

[15]  A. Prakash,et al.  Green by Choice?: Cross-National Variations in Firms' Responses to EMS-Based Environmental Regimes , 2001 .

[16]  Madhu Khanna,et al.  Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection , 1998 .

[17]  David Vogel,et al.  National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States , 1986 .

[18]  Thomas P. Lyon,et al.  Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism , 1998 .

[19]  LandscapesByPeter F. Stadlera Towards Theory: , 2021, Philosophy Behind Bars.

[20]  Albert O. Hirschman,et al.  Exit, Voice, and Loyalty , 1970 .

[21]  Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform , 1998 .

[22]  Charles M. Tiebout A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures , 1956, Journal of Political Economy.

[23]  D. McDowell Foreword , 1999 .

[24]  R. Freeman Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach , 2010 .

[25]  Aseem Prakash,et al.  The Regulation Dilemma: Cooperation and Conflict in Environmental Governance , 2004 .

[26]  M. Olson,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1965 .

[27]  Aseem Prakash,et al.  Responsible Care: An Assessment , 2000 .

[28]  F. Herzberg Work and the nature of man , 1967 .

[29]  T. L. Schwartz The Logic of Collective Action , 1986 .

[30]  Keith William Fairchild,et al.  The Politics of Regulation , 2012 .

[31]  Scott Barrett,et al.  Environmental Regulation For Competitive Advantage , 1991 .

[32]  D. Wood Corporate Social Performance Revisited , 1991 .

[33]  John W. Meyer,et al.  Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality , 1984 .

[34]  A. Tversky,et al.  The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. , 1981, Science.

[35]  Joseph Farrell,et al.  Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation , 1985 .

[36]  M. Howlett,et al.  Patterns of Policy Instrument Choice: Policy Styles, Policy Learning and the Privatization Experience , 1993 .

[37]  Jeremy Richardson,et al.  Lobbying in the European Community , 1993 .

[38]  M. Porter,et al.  Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship , 1995 .

[39]  Aseem Prakash,et al.  Regulatory Convergence in Nongovernmental Regimes? Cross-National Adoption of ISO 14001 Certifications , 2004, The Journal of Politics.

[40]  Robert D. Bullard,et al.  Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality. , 1991 .

[41]  Theodore J. Lowi,et al.  American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory , 1964 .

[42]  Michael J. Lenox,et al.  Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program , 2000 .

[43]  A. Vining,et al.  Policy analysis : concepts and practice , 1989 .

[44]  Y. Mény,et al.  Adjusting to Europe : the impact of the European Union on national institutions and policies , 1996 .

[45]  R. Cornes,et al.  The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods. 2nd. ed. , 1996 .

[46]  W. Powell,et al.  The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields , 1983 .

[47]  C. Hood The Tools of Government , 1983 .

[48]  P. Portney,et al.  Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U . S . Manufacturing : What Does the Evidence Tell Us ? , 1999 .

[49]  Colin Scott,et al.  Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State , 2004 .

[50]  Adam B. Jaffe,et al.  Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U , 1995 .

[51]  Elinor Ostrom,et al.  Governing the commons , 1990 .

[52]  Wallace E. Oates,et al.  The theory of environmental policy , 1976 .