论文信息 - Proportional income taxes and cores in a public goods economy

Proportional income taxes and cores in a public goods economy

Abstract An equivalence relationship between cores and Pareto optimal allocations of a public goods economy where the public goods are to be provided through a proportional income tax is presented. For this purpose, the definition of the core is modified by allowing coalitions to tax their complements at any given rate. Also, a certain rule which specifies the rate is introduced.

Mikio Nakayama

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