Doing What Is Right or Doing What Is Safe

The relationship between professionalization and safety is examined from two angles. One is how professionals manage high risk by doing what is right, what the trusted professional does when applying their skills and expertise in controlling a hazardous technological system. The other is doing what is safe, control of safety by a formal system of regulation, rules, procedures, codes and standards which constrains behaviour to remain within specified boundaries of operation but which must still somehow allow sufficient flexibility of behaviour to adapt to the specifics of the situation. By looking at some of the aspects of accidents and lessons learned, issues in safety and professionalism are highlighted which could be important topics for developing safety competence, in particular for the management of uncertainty and unforeseen risks. The handling of uncertainties and the mitigation of cognitive bias, the development of tacit knowledge and the use of lessons learned from successful recoveries are potential learning opportunities for both types of professional for uncertainty management. The chapter first sets out to clarify the meanings in the title and how they are different and possibly even conflicting in the approach to safety. This theme continues in examining how these issues are reflected in accidents and lessons learned. Finally, some possible ways forward are identified.

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