论文信息 - Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma

Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma

Farsighted stability is examined in an n-person prisoner’s dilemma. It is shown that any individually rational and Pareto efficient outcome is a farsighted stable set and no other farsighted stable set exists; it is further shown that the largest consistent set consists of all individually rational outcomes.

Shigeo Muto | Akihiro Suzuki

[1] L. Xue,et al. Coalitional stability under perfect foresight , 1998 .

[2] E. Rowland. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior , 1946, Nature.

[3] Drew Fudenberg,et al. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[4] J. Neumann,et al. Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945, 100 Years of Math Milestones.

[5] J. Harsanyi. An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition , 1974 .

[6] Joseph Greenberg,et al. The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach , 1990 .

[7] M. Chwe. Farsighted Coalitional Stability , 1994 .

[8] Akira Okada. The possibility of cooperation in an n-person prisoners' dilemma with institutional arrangements , 1993 .