Unitary versus collective models of the household : time to shift the burden of proof?

Until recently, most economists viewed the household as a collection of individuals who behave as if in agreement on how best to combine time and goods (purchased or produced at home) to produce commodities that maximize some common welfare index. This model has been extended far beyond standard demand analysis to include the determinants of health, fertility, education, child fostering, migration, labor supply, home production, land tenure, and crop adoption. The appeal of the unitary model is the simplicity of comparative statics generated and the diversity of issues it can address. But, argue the authors, its theoretical foundations are weak and restrictive; its underlying assumptions are of questionable validity; it has not stood up well to empirical testing; and it ignores or obscures important policy issues. They argue that economists should regard households as collective rather than unitary entities. They make a case for accepting the collective model (with cooperative and noncooperative versions) as the industry standard - with caveats. The unitary model should be regarded as a special subset of the collective approach, suitable under certain conditions. The burden of proof should shift to those who claim the unitary model as the rule and collective models as the exception. Implicit in the authors'argument is the view that household economics has not taken Becker seriously enough."A household is truly a'small factory,'"wrote Becker (1965)."It combines capital goods, raw materials, and labor to clean, feed, procreate, and otherwise produce useful commodities."The authors, too, perceive the household as a factory, which, like all factories, contains individuals who - motivated at times by altruism, at times by self-interest, and often by both - cajole, cooperate, threaten, help, argue, support, and, indeed, occasionally walk out on each other. Labor economists and industrial organization theorists have long exploited the value of going inside the black box of the factory. It is time to do the same for household economics, say the authors.

[1]  Ray Rees,et al.  Collective Labor Supply and Household Production , 1997, Journal of Political Economy.

[2]  S. Khandker,et al.  Household and intrahousehold impact of the Grameen Bank and similar targeted credit programs in Bangladesh , 1996 .

[3]  J. Hoddinott,et al.  Does Female Income Share Influence Household Expenditures? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire , 1995 .

[4]  Martin Browning,et al.  Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.

[5]  L. Haddad Intrahousehold resource allocation : an overview , 1994 .

[6]  R. Pollak,et al.  Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market , 1993, Journal of Political Economy.

[7]  Martin Browning,et al.  Intra Household Allocation of Consumption: a Model and some Evidence from French Data , 1993 .

[8]  P. Chiappori Collective Labor Supply and Welfare , 1992, Journal of Political Economy.

[9]  J. Hoddinott Rotten Kids or Manipulative Parents: Are Children Old Age Security in Western Kenya? , 1992, Economic Development and Cultural Change.

[10]  R. Kanbur,et al.  Intrahousehold inequality and the theory of targeting , 1992 .

[11]  S. Poats The role of gender in agricultural development , 1991 .

[12]  A. Witte,et al.  Domestic Violence: A Nonrandom Affair , 1991 .

[13]  How Did Workers Benefit from Bolivia's Emergency Social Fund? , 1991 .

[14]  J. Hoddinott,et al.  Household Expenditures, Child Anthropometric Status and the Intrahousehold Division of Income: Evidence from the Cote d'Ivoire , 1991 .

[15]  R. Kanbur Linear Expenditure Systems, Children as Public Goods and Intra-Household Inequality , 1991 .

[16]  R. Blumberg Gender, Family and Economy: The Triple Overlap , 1990 .

[17]  R. Kanbur,et al.  How serious is the neglect of intrahousehold inequality , 1990 .

[18]  Donald Cox,et al.  Achieving Social Objectives through Private Transfers: A Review , 1990 .

[19]  Michael Waldman,et al.  The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma , 1990 .

[20]  M. McElroy The Empirical Content of Nash- Bargained Household Behavior , 1990 .

[21]  Duncan C. Thomas Intra-household resource allocation: an inferential approach , 1990 .

[22]  T. Schultz Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility , 1990 .

[23]  T. Bergstrom A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem - eScholarship , 1989 .

[24]  P. Apps,et al.  Labour supply, welfare rankings and the measurement of inequality , 1989 .

[25]  Fumio Hayashi,et al.  Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests Using Micro Data , 1989 .

[26]  J. Braun,et al.  The Impact of New Crop Technology on the Agricultural Division of Labor in a West African Setting , 1989 .

[27]  M. Rosenzweig,et al.  Productivity, health and inequality in the intrahousehold distribution of food in low-income countries , 1989 .

[28]  John C. Harsanyi,et al.  Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games , 1989 .

[29]  J. Leslie Women's Work and Child Nutrition in the Third World , 1988 .

[30]  Shelly Lundberg,et al.  Labor Supply of Husbands and Wives: A Simultaneous Equations Approach , 1988 .

[31]  P. Apps,et al.  Taxation and the household , 1988 .

[32]  G. Becker Family Economics and Macro Behavior , 1988 .

[33]  R. Blumberg Income Under Female Versus Male Control , 1988, Journal of family issues.

[34]  P. Chiappori RATIONAL HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY , 1988 .

[35]  B. Bernheim,et al.  Altruism within the Family Reconsidered: Do Nice Guys Finish Last? , 1988 .

[36]  Donald Cox Motives for Private Income Transfers , 1987, Journal of Political Economy.

[37]  I. Singh Agricultural household models : extensions, applications, and policy , 1987 .

[38]  E. Kennedy,et al.  Comparative analyses of nutritional effectiveness of food subsidies and other food-related interventions , 1987 .

[39]  M. Rosenzweig Program interventions, intrahousehold distribution and the welfare of individuals: Modelling household behavior , 1986 .

[40]  N. Folbre Hearts and spades: Paradigms of household economics , 1986 .

[41]  B. Douglas Bernheim,et al.  The Strategic Bequest Motive , 1985, Journal of Political Economy.

[42]  O. Stark Motivations to Remit: Evidence from Botswana , 1985, Journal of Political Economy.

[43]  A. Rubinstein,et al.  The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling , 1985 .

[44]  E. Thorbecke,et al.  A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures , 1984 .

[45]  J. Pahl The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of Inequality within Marriage , 1983, The Sociological review.

[46]  G. Beaton,et al.  Supplementary feeding programs for young children in developing countries. , 1982, The American journal of clinical nutrition.

[47]  G. Becker,et al.  A Treatise on the Family , 1982 .

[48]  J. Guyer Household budgets and women's incomes , 1980 .

[49]  J. Hirshleifer Shakespeare vs. Becker on Altruism: The Importance of Having the Last Word , 1977 .

[50]  R. Barro Are Government Bonds Net Wealth? , 1974, Journal of Political Economy.

[51]  G. Becker,et al.  A Theory of Social Interactions , 1974, Journal of Political Economy.

[52]  G. Becker Chapter Title: a Theory of Marriage a Theory of Marriage , 2022 .

[53]  James J. Heckman,et al.  The Estimation of Income and Substitution Effects in a Model of Family Labor Supply , 1971 .

[54]  Amartya Sen,et al.  Labour Allocation in a Cooperative Enterprise , 1966 .

[55]  G. Becker,et al.  A Theory of the Allocation of Time , 1965 .

[56]  P. Samuelson Social Indifference Curves , 1956 .

[57]  E. C. Hayhow,et al.  Healthcare agenda for the Indian government , 1939, The Indian journal of medical research.