A Note on Matsushima's Regularity Condition
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This note first uses a simple example to show that H. Matsushima's (1991, J. Econ. Theory54, 198–203) regularity condition, to the contrary of his claim, actually does not imply C. d'Aspremont and L.-A. Gerard-Varet's (1979, J. Public Econ.11, 25–45) compatibility condition. It then proves a stronger version of Matsushima's proposition, namely that efficient public decision rules can be truthfully implemented with budget-balancing mechanisms under the weak regularity condition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.
[1] Hitoshi Matsushima. Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments , 1993 .
[2] C. d'Aspremont,et al. Incentives and incomplete information , 1979 .
[3] Masaki Aoyagi,et al. Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance , 1998 .
[4] Hitoshi Matsushima,et al. Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability , 1991 .