Local connectivity effects in learning and coordination dynamics in a two-layer network.

Anticoordination and chimera states occur in a two-layer model of learning and coordination dynamics in fully connected networks. Learning occurs in the intra-layer networks, while a coordination game is played in the inter-layer network. In this paper, we study the robustness of these states against local effects introduced by the local connectivity of random networks. We identify threshold values for the mean degree of the networks such that below these values, local effects prevent the existence of anticoordination and chimera states found in the fully connected setting. Local effects in the intra-layer learning network are more important than in the inter-layer network in preventing the existence of anticoordination states. The local connectivity of the intra- and inter-layer networks is important to avoid the occurrence of chimera states, but the local effects are stronger in the inter-layer coordination network than in the intra-layer learning network. We also study the effect of local connectivity on the problem of equilibrium selection in the asymmetric coordination game, showing that local effects favor the selection of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in situations in which the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in the fully connected network. In this case, again, the important local effects are those associated with the coordination dynamics inter-layer network. Indeed, lower average degree of the network connectivity between layers reduces the probability of achieving the risk-dominant strategy, favoring the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.

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