Belief Revision: Belief revision: An introduction

Now suppose that, as a matter of fact , the bird caught in the trap turns out to be black. This means that you want to add the fact ¬ ε, i.e., the negation of ε, to the database. But then the database becomes inconsistent . If you want to keep the database consistent, which is normally a sound methodology, you need to revise it. This means that some of the beliefs in the original database must be retracted. You don't want to give up all of the beliefs since this would be an unnecessary loss of valuable information. So you have to choose between retracting α, β, γ or δ.

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