论文信息 - Interpretive Economy, Schelling Points, and evolutionary stability ∗ - 字舞流文

Interpretive Economy, Schelling Points, and evolutionary stability ∗

I attempt to show that Kennedy's (2007) Interpretive Economy princi- ple follows from basic assumptions about cognitive prominence and evolution- ary stability.

Christopher Potts

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