Threshold Encrypted Mempools: Limitations and Considerations

Encrypted mempools are a class of solutions aimed at preventing or reducing negative externalities of MEV extraction using cryptographic privacy. Mempool encryption aims to hide information related to pending transactions until a block including the transactions is committed, targeting the prevention of frontrunning and similar behaviour. Among the various methods of encryption, threshold schemes are particularly interesting for the design of MEV mitigation mechanisms, as their distributed nature and minimal hardware requirements harmonize with a broader goal of decentralization. This work looks beyond the formal and technical cryptographic aspects of threshold encryption schemes to focus on the market and incentive implications of implementing encrypted mempools as MEV mitigation techniques. In particular, this paper argues that the deployment of such protocols without proper consideration and understanding of market impact invites several undesired outcomes, with the ultimate goal of stimulating further analysis of this class of solutions outside of pure cryptograhic considerations. Included in the paper is an overview of a series of problems, various candidate solutions in the form of mempool encryption techniques with a focus on threshold encryption, potential drawbacks to these solutions, and Osmosis as a case study. The paper targets a broad audience and remains agnostic to blockchain design where possible while drawing from mostly financial examples.

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