Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks
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Shaojie Tang | Xiang-Yang Li | Jizhong Zhao | Ping Xu | Xiangyang Li | Shaojie Tang | Jizhong Zhao | Ping Xu
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