Social Value of Public Information

What are the welfare effects of enhanced dissemination of public information through the media and disclosures by market participants with high public visibility? We examine the impact of public information in a setting where agents take actions appropriate to the underlying fundamentals, but they also have a coordination motive arising from a strategic complementarity in their actions. When the agents have no socially valuable private information, greater provision of public information always increases welfare. However, when agents also have access to independent sources of information, the welfare effect of increased public disclosures is ambiguous.

[1]  Matthew C. Rousu,et al.  Effects and Value of Verifiable Information in a Controversial Market: Evidence from Lab Auctions of Genetically Modified Food , 2007 .

[2]  Jakob de Haan,et al.  Look Who's Talking: ECB Communication During the First Years of Emu , 2004, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[3]  Petra Gerlach-Kristen,et al.  Is the Mpc's Voting Record Informative About Future UK Monetary Policy? , 2004 .

[4]  L. Samuelson.  Modeling knowledge in economic analysis , 2004 .

[5]  Marcel Fratzscher,et al.  Equal Size, Equal Role? Interest Rate Interdependence between the Euro Area and the United States , 2004, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[6]  A. Heifetz.  Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge. , 2004 .

[7]  D. Kahneman.  Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics , 2003 .

[8]  S. Morris,et al.  Communication and Monetary Policy , 2002 .

[9]  Christian Hellwig,et al.  Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[10]  J. Proudman,et al.  Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making , 2002 .

[11]  S. Baliga,et al.  Arms Races and Negotiations , 2002 .

[12]  Christina E. Metz,et al.  Private and Public Information in Self-fulfilling Currency Crises , 2002 .

[13]  S. Eijffinger,et al.  How Transparent are Central Banks? , 2002 .

[14]  S. Morris,et al.  Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt , 2002 .

[15]  S. Morris,et al.  Global Games: Theory and Applications , 2001 .

[16]  D. Hirshleifer,et al.  Conversation, Observational Learning, and Informational Cascades , 2000 .

[17]  A. Sibert.  Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations , 1999, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[18]  O. Issing.  The Eurosystem: Transparent andAccountable or 'Willem in Euroland' , 1999 .

[19]  D. Samet.  Iterated Expectations and Common Priors , 1998 .

[20]  Terrance Odean,et al.  Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders are Above Average , 1998 .

[21]  Lars E. O. Svensson,et al.  Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals , 1998 .

[22]  A. Blinder.  Central Banking in Theory and Practice , 1998 .

[23]  Siew Hong Teoh,et al.  Information Disclosure and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods , 1997 .

[24]  S. Morris.  The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory , 1995, Economics and Philosophy.

[25]  Neil D. Pearson,et al.  Differential Interpretation of Public Signals and Trade in Speculative Markets , 1995, Journal of Political Economy.

[26]  Michael Raith.  A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly , 1993 .

[27]  A. Banerjee,et al.  A Simple Model of Herd Behavior , 1992 .

[28]  M. Woodford.  Learning to Believe in Sunspots , 1990 .

[29]  A. Spanos,et al.  Statistical Foundations of Econometric Modelling. , 1988 .

[30]  Karl Shell,et al.  Do Sunspots Matter? , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.

[31]  Costas Azariadis.  Self-fulfilling prophecies , 1981 .

[32]  O. Svenson.  ARE WE ALL LESS RISKY AND MORE SKILLFUL THAN OUR FELLOW DRIVERS , 1981 .

[33]  L. Ross,et al.  Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence , 1979 .

[34]  Robert M. Townsend,et al.  Market Anticipations, Rational Expectations, and Bayesian Analysis , 1978 .

[35]  R. Lucas.  Expectations and the neutrality of money , 1972 .

[36]  R. Radner,et al.  Team Decision Problems , 1962 .

[37]  J. Keynes.  The General Theory of Employment , 1937 .

[38]  S Vandebuerie,et al.  OUT OF THE LOOP , 2004 .

[39]  N. Roubini,et al.  NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INTERNATIONAL LENDING OF LAST RESORT AND MORAL HAZARD: A MODEL OF IMF’S CATALYTIC FINANCE , 2003 .

[40]  A. Blinder.  How Do Central Banks Talk , 2001 .

[41]  Ari Hyytinen,et al.  Preventing systemic crises through bank transparency , 2001 .

[42]  P. Wachtel,et al.  Inflationary Expectations: Reply and Further Thoughts on Inflation Uncertainty , 1982 .

[43]  P. Wachtel,et al.  Differential Inflationary Expectations and the Variability of the Rate of Inflation: Theory and Evidence , 1979 .

[44]  J. Keynes,et al.  The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money , 1978 .

[45]  L. Robert.  Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs. , 1973 .

[46]  J. Hirshleifer.  The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity , 1971 .

[47]  J. Keynes.  GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST. , 1961 .

[48]  Stephanie Rennick.  Self-Fulfilling Prophecies , 2022 .