The Ends of Improvisation

centuryhad next to no solo improvisations. In the usual recounting of jazz history, the arrival of jazz as a mature art form is synonymous with the move from Dixieland's group improvisations to the prominence of the improvising soloist, exemplified by Louis Armstrong. But how do we account for, or assess, this recounting? What makes the improvised solo, as it has developed in the wake of Armstrong, a maturation of the possibilities of this art form? The following is an attempt to address this question in a small way by considering the significance of one distinguishable feature of an improvised jazz solohow it endsin light of Joseph Kerman's seemingly parallel consideration of the history of development of the endings in classical concertos. This effort will lead me to propose a counter-parallel, between the jazz improviser's attitude toward the solo's end and Wittgenstein's attitude toward our (or philosophy's) arriving at the end of justifications. The parallel will depend on one's granting that both the improviser and Wittgenstein are, in their distinct ways, doing battle against the recurring human fantasy of the fixity of experience. The essay concludes with an illustration of the jazz improviser 's treatment of the solo's end that should help to bring out how that battle is wagedand, in exemplary instances, wonon the bandstand and in the studio.