Macedonian Border Closings in the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

The 1999 Kosovo crisis generated more than 800,000 refugees, the majority of whom fled into Albania or Macedonia. While Albanians welcomed their ethnic kin, Macedonia closed its border three times. We provide a game-theoretic perspective on strategic interactions between Macedonia and NATO. We use narrative accounts of the crisis to eliminate many configurations of payoffs. Among those remaining, the theory of moves isolates one game that can satisfy the necessary conditions for credible threats: the prisoners' dilemma. Credible threats of border closings in a prisoners' dilemma alter donor incentives and lead to international sharing of asylum burdens in repeated play.

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