The Understanding and Forecast of AS-Level Anycast Path Inflation

Anycast, as a network layer solution for providing faster and stabler services to end-users, is actively deployed on the Internet today. A common argument is that the underpinning routing system will automatically direct users to the closest site among the set of anycast sites. However, anycast path inflations are observed, where users are unexpectedly directed to a site farther away. In this paper, we study a specific kind of anycast path inflation called AS-level Anycast Path Inflation (AAPI). AAPI means, after the deployment of an anycast site in a different Autonomous System (AS), the number of ASes that traffic passes through is larger than that before, so that users may experience increased latencies or be exposed to higher inter-domain security risks. We discuss AAPI’s causes, analyse its characteristics, and propose deployment guidance. In particular, we classify AAPI in two basic forms, i.e. Route Suppression (RS) and Route Promotion (RP), and present their various characteristics as well as their possible coupling. We propose Conflict Point (CP), a topological feature which represents the intrinsic conflict between routing policies and AS path length at these nodes, to further study the necessary and sufficient conditions for AAPI. And based on the properties of CP, we give some suggestions on anycast deployment strategy to avoid AAPI and verify them by simulation.

[1]  Paul Francis,et al.  A measurement-based deployment proposal for IP anycast , 2006, IMC '06.

[2]  Andreas Terzis,et al.  On the Use of Anycast in DNS , 2005, Proceedings of 15th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks.

[3]  Yakov Rekhter,et al.  A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4) , 1994, RFC.

[4]  Giovane C. M. Moura,et al.  Anycast vs. DDoS: Evaluating the November 2015 Root DNS Event , 2016, Internet Measurement Conference.

[5]  Ratul Mahajan,et al.  Analyzing the Performance of an Anycast CDN , 2015, Internet Measurement Conference.

[6]  Ratul Mahajan,et al.  Colt ? ? ? ? ? ? ◦ DTAG ? ◦ • ◦ ? ? ? ? ! ◦ ? ? ? ◦ ◦ ? ? Eqip ? ? ? ? ? ? , 2003 .

[7]  Ramesh Govindan,et al.  Internet path inflation due to policy routing , 2001, SPIE ITCom.

[8]  Lorenzo Colitti,et al.  Evaluating the effects of anycast on DNS root name servers , 2006 .

[9]  Jared M. Smith,et al.  Routing Around Congestion: Defeating DDoS Attacks and Adverse Network Conditions via Reactive BGP Routing , 2018, 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP).

[10]  Paul Traina Autonomous System Confederations for BGP , 1996, RFC.

[11]  Christian Huitema,et al.  An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers , 2001, RFC.

[12]  Stephen McQuistin,et al.  Taming Anycast in the Wild Internet , 2019, Internet Measurement Conference.

[13]  Lixin Gao,et al.  Stable Internet routing without global coordination , 2000, SIGMETRICS '00.

[14]  Dario Rossi,et al.  Characterizing IPv4 anycast adoption and deployment , 2015, CoNEXT.

[15]  Craig Partridge,et al.  Host Anycasting Service , 1993, RFC.

[16]  Enke Chen,et al.  BGP Support for Four-octet AS Number Space , 2007, RFC.

[17]  Lixin Gao,et al.  The extent of AS path inflation by routing policies , 2002, Global Telecommunications Conference, 2002. GLOBECOM '02. IEEE.

[18]  Bobby Bhattacharjee,et al.  Internet anycast: performance, problems, & potential , 2018, SIGCOMM.

[19]  Jan Harm Kuipers,et al.  Analyzing the K-root DNS Anycast Infrastructure , 2015 .

[20]  Lixia Zhang,et al.  Understanding Resiliency of Internet Topology against Prefix Hijack Attacks , 2007, 37th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN'07).

[21]  Marianne Winslett,et al.  Inter-domain routing bottlenecks and their aggravation , 2019, Comput. Networks.

[22]  Qixin Gao,et al.  Quantifying AS Path Inflation by Routing Policies , 2016 .

[23]  Kimberly C. Claffy,et al.  Two Days in the Life of the DNS Anycast Root Servers , 2007, PAM.