Negotiating the Distribution of Obligations with Sanctions among Autonomous Agents

In this paper we study the distribution of obligations together with their associated sanctions among agents belonging to collective entities like groups and organizations. We model the distribution as a negotiation process among the agents, we model the behavior of the agents in a qualitative game theory, and we formalize them in a logical framework. We characterize collective obligations according to the way the responsibility in case of violation is attributed to individual agents or to the whole set of agents, where we distinguish among violations during the negotiation and during the execution of the task. We also show that in some cases it is a drawback to be the only agent able to see to the fulfilment of part of an obligation, but in other cases it may be an advantage, because of the power it gives to the agent during the negotiation.

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