Circuit-level information leakage prevention for fault detection

The security of cryptographic devices is gaining significance, of late, owing to their important role in ensuring information security in the internet of things (IoT). Amongst various implementation attacks, the laser and electromagnetic (EM) fault-based attacks are considered the most powerful because of their control over the injection timing and position. This paper discusses a practical countermeasure against fault attacks, focusing on a secure measure to prevent information leakage, in particular, after a fault is detected. Preliminary experiments using a field programmable gate array (FPGA) board show that cutting off the power supply (VDD) could be an effective counter-measure for preventing information leakage from cryptographic devices under the fault attacks.

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