Conventional Semantic Meaning in Signalling Games with Conflicting Interests

Lewis signalling games are often used to explain how it is possible for simple agents to develop systems of conventional semantic meaning. In these games, all players obtain identical payoffs in every outcome. This is an unrealistic payoff structure, but it is often employed because it is thought that semantic meaning will not emerge if interests conflict. Here it is shown that not only is conventional meaning possible when interests conflict, but it is the most likely outcome in a finite population model of learning known as the Moran process. On the basis of this result it is suggested that evolutionary game theory’s standard models (which presuppose populations that are effectively infinite) may yield results that are systematically distorted for a class of signalling games that have the abstract structure of social dilemmas. 1   Introduction 2   The Seduction Game 3   Imitation Dynamics with Small Mutations 4   Dynamics with Unverifiable Message 5   Analysis of a Related Three-Strategy Game 6   Conclusion 1   Introduction 2   The Seduction Game 3   Imitation Dynamics with Small Mutations 4   Dynamics with Unverifiable Message 5   Analysis of a Related Three-Strategy Game 6   Conclusion