论文信息 - The Fragility of Information Aggregation in Large Elections - 字舞流文

The Fragility of Information Aggregation in Large Elections

Article history: Received 3 September 2009 Available online xxxx JEL classification: C72 D72

Michael Mandler | Michael Mandler

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