论文信息 - On the long-run efficiency of auctioned vs. free permits

On the long-run efficiency of auctioned vs. free permits

Abstract When marketable permits affect the entry/exit decisions of competitive firms, the efficient proportion of auctioned vs. free permits depends on the pollutant’s nature. All permits should be auctioned for global pollutants, and some should be free for local pollutants.

Catherine L. Kling | Jinhua Zhao

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