SPI2F - A Prototype Code Generator for Security Protocols

This thesis describes a new prototype tool that automatically generates a secure F# implementation of any protocol described in the Spi calculus. Type systems were previously proposed for analysing the security of both Spi calculus processes and F# implementations. The thesis investigates a formal translation from the Spi calculus to F# that is proved to preserve typability, and therefore the security properties of the original protocol are preserved.

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