An Adaptive Control Defense Scheme of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids

Due to vulnerability caused by the openness of smart grids, False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) can be injected by hacker with a bank of false attack sequences to damage the operation of the grid system by compromising the measurement equipment. Hence, the emergence of the FDIA has brought enormous threats to the security mechanism of smart grids. To solve this problem, an adaptive defense scheme against FDIA is proposed in this paper. A dynamic grid model that considers the changes of internally physical dynamics is established. Based on this model, a class of adaptive defense controllers are constructed by studying the characteristics of FDIA. The designed adaptive defense controller can update the information from the system in real time and adjust the states constantly, which makes the grid system under attacks keep stable. Finally, the effectiveness of the adaptive defense scheme against the FDIA is verified by the simulation results on the IEEE-9 bus smart grid system.

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