PUEGM: A Method of User Revenue Selection Based on a Publisher-User Evolutionary Game Model for Mobile Crowdsensing

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a way to use social resources to solve high-precision environmental awareness problems in real time. Publishers hope to collect as much sensed data as possible at a relatively low cost, while users want to earn more revenue at a low cost. Low-quality data will reduce the efficiency of MCS and lead to a loss of revenue. However, existing work lacks research on the selection of user revenue under the premise of ensuring data quality. In this paper, we propose a Publisher-User Evolutionary Game Model (PUEGM) and a revenue selection method to solve the evolutionary stable equilibrium problem based on non-cooperative evolutionary game theory. Firstly, the choice of user revenue is modeled as a Publisher-User Evolutionary Game Model. Secondly, based on the error-elimination decision theory, we combine a data quality assessment algorithm in the PUEGM, which aims to remove low-quality data and improve the overall quality of user data. Finally, the optimal user revenue strategy under different conditions is obtained from the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) solution and stability analysis. In order to verify the efficiency of the proposed solutions, extensive experiments using some real data sets are conducted. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed method has high accuracy of data quality assessment and a reasonable selection of user revenue.

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