The voluntary contributions mechanism with real time revisions

Experimental results are presented showing the effects of allowing real time revisions of voluntary contributions for the provision of a public good. Four public good payoff functions are examined, each of which generates specific equilibria. Evidence of increased provision of the public good is demonstrated for: (i) the case in which revisions are limited to increases and a provision point exists, and also (ii) when there is a high initial marginal return from the public good.

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