Online decision making in crowdsourcing markets: theoretical challenges

Over the past decade, crowdsourcing has emerged as a cheap and efficient method of obtaining solutions to simple tasks that are difficult for computers to solve but possible for humans. The popularity and promise of crowdsourcing markets has led to both empirical and theoretical research on the design of algorithms to optimize various aspects of these markets, such as the pricing and assignment of tasks. Much of the existing theoretical work on crowdsourcing markets has focused on problems that fall into the broad category of online decision making; task requesters or the crowdsourcing platform itself make repeated decisions about prices to set, workers to filter out, problems to assign to specific workers, or other things. Often these decisions are complex, requiring algorithms that learn about the distribution of available tasks or workers over time and take into account the strategic (or sometimes irrational) behavior of workers. As human computation grows into its own field, the time is ripe to address these challenges in a principled way. However, it appears very difficult to capture all pertinent aspects of crowdsourcing markets in a single coherent model. In this paper, we reflect on the modeling issues that inhibit theoretical research on online decision making for crowdsourcing, and identify some steps forward. This paper grew out of the authors' own frustration with these issues, and we hope it will encourage the community to attempt to understand, debate, and ultimately address them.

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