Performance and Risk Management of Real Estate Enterprises

For the low efficiency and high risk of real estate enterprises in China, we design incentives-supervision model of a real estate enterprise based on principal-agent theory and on some characteristics of the real estate enterprises. Subsequently, in order to improve business performance and lower the risks, we study that how the clients of the real estate enterprises design the compensation for agents and supervisors of different ability levels and risk appetites in the different boom stages of the real estate market. Finally, some policy recommendations are put forwarded.

[1]  Theodore W. Schultz.  Diminishing Returns in View of Progress in Agricultural Production , 1932 .

[2]  Theodore W. Schultz,et al.  Theory of the Firm and Farm Management Research , 1939 .

[3]  Cyril Burt,et al.  THE TWO‐FACTOR THEORY , 1949 .

[4]  A. Maslow.  Motivation and Personality , 1954 .

[5]  Pierre Jinghong Liang,et al.  Optimal Team Size and Monitoring in Organizations , 2008 .

[6]  G. Becker,et al.  Economics of Marital Instability , 1976 .

[7]  J. Mirrlees.  The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I , 1999 .

[8]  G. G. Stokes.  "J." , 1890, The New Yale Book of Quotations.

[9]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design , 1991 .

[10]  Bengt Holmstrom,et al.  Moral Hazard and Observability , 1979 .

[11]  Adam Smith,et al.  The Wealth of Nations , 1999 .

[12]  Pierre Jinghong Liang,et al.  Optimal Team Size and Monitoring in Organizations , 2007 .

[13]  P ? ? ? ? ? ? ? % ? ? ? ? , 1991 .

[14]  G. Becker,et al.  A Theory of Social Interactions , 1974, Journal of Political Economy.

[15]  James A. Mirrlees,et al.  Notes on Welfare Economics, Information, and Uncertainty , 2006 .

[16]  Jean Tirole,et al.  Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form , 1991 .

[17]  John Roberts,et al.  The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited , 1998 .

[18]  Theodore W. Schultz,et al.  Capital Rationing, Uncertainty, and Farm-Tenancy Reform , 1940, Journal of Political Economy.

[19]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES , 1987 .