Optimal dynamic advertising with an adverse exogenous effect on brand goodwill

We propose the model of a firm that advertises a product in a homogeneous market, where a constant exogenous interference is present. Using the framework of Nerlove and Arrow's advertising model, we assume that the interference acts additively on goodwill production as a negative term. Hence, we allow that the goodwill may become negative and we associate a zero demand with negative goodwill values. We consider a piecewise linear demand function and formulate a nonsmooth optimal-control problem with an infinite horizon. We obtain that an optimal advertising policy exists and takes one of two forms: either a positive and constant advertising effort, or a decreasing effort starting from a positive level and eventually reaching the zero value at a finite exit time. In the former scenario, the demand is always positive and the firm stays in the market in the long run; in the latter, the demand becomes zero in the short run, and afterward, the firm goes out of business. In both cases we have an explicit representation of the optimal control, which is obtained through the study of an auxiliary smooth optimal-control problem. It is interesting that the fundamental choice between staying in the market and going out of business at some time depends both on the interference level and on the initial goodwill level.