Hardware Sandboxing: A Novel Defense Paradigm Against Hardware Trojans in Systems on Chip

A novel approach for mitigation of hardware Trojan in Systems on Chip (SoC) is presented. With the assumption that Trojans can cause harm only when they are activated, the goal is to avoid cumbersome and sometimes destructive pre-fabrication and pre-deployment tests for Trojans in SoCs, by building systems capable of capturing Trojan activation or simply nullifying their effect at run-time to prevent damage to the system. To reach this goal, non-trusted third-party IPs and components off the shelf (COTS) are executed in sandboxes with checkers and virtual resources. While checkers are used to detect run-time activation of Trojans and mitigate potential damage to the system, virtual resources are provided to IPs in the sandbox, thus preventing direct access to physical resources. Our approach was validated with benchmarks from trust-hub.com, a synthetic system on FPGA scenario using the same benchmark. All our results showed a 100% Trojan detection and mitigation, with only a minimal increase in resource overhead and no performance decrease.

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