Hey Look at Me: The Effect of Giving Circles on Giving

Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a Yale University service club to test the impact of a promise of public recognition on giving. Some may claim that they respond to an offer of public recognition not to improve their social standing, but rather to motivate others to give. To tease apart these two theories, we conduct a laboratory experiment with undergraduates, and found no evidence to support the alternative, altruistic motivation. We conclude that charitable gifts increase in response to the promise of public recognition primarily because of individuals' desire to improve their social image.

[1]  Lise Vesterlund,et al.  The informational value of sequential fundraising , 2003 .

[2]  James Andreoni,et al.  Chapter 18 Philanthropy , 2006 .

[3]  David Reinstein,et al.  Reputation and influence in charitable giving: an experiment , 2011, Theory and Decision.

[4]  N. Lacetera,et al.  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Social Image Concerns and Prosocial Behavior: Field Evidence from a Nonlinear Incentive Scheme , 2022 .

[5]  L. Vesterlund,et al.  After You - Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games , 2005 .

[6]  J. Andreoni.  Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence , 1989, Journal of Political Economy.

[7]  Jean Tirole,et al.  Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets , 2007, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[8]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Visibility of Contributions and Cost of Information: An Experiment on Public Goods , 2010 .

[9]  M. McConnell,et al.  No Excuses for Good Behavior , 2009 .

[10]  Amihai Glazer,et al.  A Signaling Explanation for Charity , 1996 .

[11]  Douglas L. Miller,et al.  Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors , 2007 .

[12]  B. Bernheim,et al.  A Theory of Conformity , 1994, Journal of Political Economy.

[13]  E. Cartwright,et al.  How Category Reporting Can Improve Fundraising , 2013 .

[14]  J. Andreoni,et al.  Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising , 2004 .

[15]  J. Tirole,et al.  Incentives and Prosocial Behavior , 2004 .

[16]  William T. Harbaugh.  What do donations buy?: A model of philanthropy based on prestige and warm glow , 1998 .

[17]  A. Soetevent.  Payment Choice, Image Motivation and Contributions to Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment , 2009 .

[18]  D. Ariely,et al.  Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially , 2007, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[19]  E. Fehr,et al.  Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments , 1999, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[20]  Jen Shang,et al.  A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods , 2009 .

[21]  Sera Linardi,et al.  No excuses for good behavior: Volunteering and the social environment , 2011 .

[22]  Yohanes E. Riyanto,et al.  Category Reporting in Charitable Giving: An Experimental Analysis , 2017 .

[23]  T. Veblen.  The Theory of the Leisure Class , 1901 .

[24]  Martin Sefton,et al.  Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study , 2007 .

[25]  John A. List,et al.  Matching and challenge gifts to charity: evidence from laboratory and natural field experiments , 2008, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[26]  J. Andreoni.  Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects , 2009 .

[27]  P. DeMarzo,et al.  Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions , 2001 .

[28]  Rachel Croson,et al.  Field experiments in charitable contribution: The impact of social influence on the voluntary provision of public goods , 2006 .