Challenge to Reason

idea called whole system; he must do this if he is to be realistic about his plans. He cannot avoid making strong assumptions because he must make certain assumptions about the whole-system preferences of the producer. Thus it seems as though we can't keep the two characters of our story apart: The realist and idealist merge. On the other hand, these two characters do seem to exist in the real-life story of human foibles. It is easy to recognize the "hardheaded" politician or businessman who shies away from abstract, nebulous ideas, who deals in tangibles, who wants the facts and not the theories, who above all exists in the world of the feasible. Whenever ideas drive him to consider superworlds and vague consequences, he abandons the idea for the world he can deal with. He is not a great, over all planner, but a man who charges in where real opportunity exists and deals with the factors that really matter. Perhaps we can search for the distinction between the realist and the idealist by returning to the notion of a system. As I have said, in a system the parts have reality only by virtue of their relationship to other parts. The wheel of a car is really a wheel only because there is an axle and the axle is real only because there is a frame. These are very familiar connections between the parts of systems. We have been discussing a much more subtle systematic connection. We said that the time constraint on the number of items that could be produced was a real constraint only because the producer chose to construct his whole world in such a manner. In other words, this constraint follows from the value system of the producer. The reality of the time constraint is a consequence of the way in which the producer chooses to design the manufacturing part of his system with respect to his whole system. It is true, as I have said, that the word system has many different meanings in discourse, but all along we are concerned with the design of systems to accomplish a set of purposes. From this point of view, the parts of the system bear special relationship to the whole; namely, in principle it should be possible to evaluate a part in terms of its system effectiveness, that is, in terms of its contribution to the attainment of the system objectives. More precisely, associated with each part we should in principle be able to determine an effectiveness measure; given a fixed state of the rest of the system, the more effective a part becomes (within specified limits) the better will be the whole system. The question of system design is directly concerned with this effectiveness measure. The question is whether this measure can be developed without having to make any assumptions about the whole system and its characteristics. In other words, is it possible to specify a part objective and a part environment which will be sufficient to determine a measure of effectiveness of the part? Now we can suggest a solution to the distinction between the realist and the idealist. Perhaps we can say that a realist is one who believes in concentrating his attention on the parts, all other things being equal; he believes it is realistic for us simply to consider the part and not bother our heads about the obscure whole. Consequently, when the realist looks at a system, he tries to ex182 THE ETHICS OF WHOLE SYSTEMS amine where the troubles really are, and to do this he examines the behavior of each part. A Governor of the State of California once issued a mandate that all parts of the system reduce expenditures by 10 percent. This is an application of the realist philosophy because it is based on the notion that if one looks into each part, it will be possible to remove sufficient waste of time and money to make the required reduction in expenditure. One can do this part by part, says the realist, without having to concern oneself about the effect on the whole system. In other words, to the realist a part can be realistically considered because the parts can be made separable. From the point of view of system design, separable parts can be considered on their own grounds, each being affected without the need to think explicitly of the whole system. Thus if the realist thinks of himself as an individual, he may decide to be an excellent entrepreneur, golfer, husband, and lover, and in each part of his life set specific goals appropriate for that part. Or the President of the U.S.A. may think that he can design an educational plan, an antipoverty plan, a defense plan, and a health plan, each as a separable program of his administration. The realist thinks he can perfect each part of his life or his nation without a strong reference to the other parts. But since no one is pure in any of the categories of human life, one should say that the realist is an individual who tends to try to look at the parts of the system as though they were separable. Does this distinction really help? It seems to characterize the practical man of affairs, if not the classical realist. The practical man of affairs seems to believe that each problem can be handled on its own terms. But the trouble is that the idealist has no difficulty whatsoever in making this description of the realist look silly. Suppose the realist argues that it's absolutely essential to reduce costs in each part by 10 percent. Probably this can be done. The idealist will point out that, if in principle it has been possible to reduce costs 10 percent in the past, then why haven't we? If the realist answers that people are careless, and that if they tighten their belts they can really accomplish the cost reduction, the idealist goes to work and shows how REALISM AND IDEALISM 183 the parts are in fact not separable at all. For example, supposing one part of the government decides to cut costs by simply eliminating a function, such as the collection of health records, which it does not regard to be an essential part of its activities. Thus the school system might stop collecting health records of students on the expectation that these things could more adequately be done by the Health Department. But of course the Health Department is actually engaged in trying to accomplish a 10 percent reduction itself and cannot take on the additional load placed on it by the action of the Education Department. The point, says the idealist and long-range planner, is not the reduction of costs per se but the way in which the reduction of costs spells out more effective or less effective plans of the society. One cannot perfect the operations of one component of the system without looking at the way in which this effectiveness is accomplished and the way in which it reacts with other parts of the system. Thus many realists become very puzzled and annoyed by what they consider the irrationalities of their social world, crime, slums, discrimination, cheating in social welfare; they wish to clear up the mess whereever they find it. But in their attempts to "improve things" they create disturbances in other parts of the system, disturbances that come back on them and forestall their improvements. We are all aware of the instances where, under the claim of instituting new freedoms, government agencies indulge in spying, wire tapping, suppressing freedom of speech and political action. Slums become cleared away only to be replaced by ugly parking lots, and the slum dwellers reappear in some other ghetto of the city. The idealist and long-range planner argue that the whole system has to be understood as a complex of competing parts, each wanting something that constrains the others. Consequently the parts of the system cannot be looked at as separable from one another. Hence the notion that a realist is someone who believes in the separability of the parts of the system makes him look ridiculous. So far we have been concentrating our attention on the realist. What about the idealist and long-range planner? They also come out to look quite ridiculous in the context of systems thinking. 184 THE ETHICS OF WHOLE SYSTEMS REALISM AND IDEALISM 185 If we take the idealist seriously, no one can act unless he knows the whole of reality, which he never will. The practical decision maker knows that he must act. The idealist and long-range planner ramble on endlessly about all kinds of ramifications and postpone the moment of action indefinitely. Indeed, in some cases it appears as though the planner is not interested in action at all. He is perfectly satisfied if he comes up with what he regards as a suitable plan. He becomes quite indifferent to the problem of how his plan can be implemented. Quite inconsistently, he assumes this to be somebody else's job: Suddenly he assumes his planning part is separate from the implementation part. Thus the idealist will talk about unilateral disarmament, or a scheme by which the nations of the world agree to be bonded and could be penalized for aggressive acts. Once he has suggested either of these plans he thinks his job is done; he is not concerned at all about how the plans could possibly get into action given the international political situation. The paradox of the idealist is that he himself believes in a vicious separability of thinking and action. Perhaps here then is a basis on which we can find a distinction between our two characters. Suppose we say the practical aspect of the realist lies in his belief in action even when action entails risks. The realist in other words is sensitive to the problems of timing. The idealist on the other hand believes in the reality of the plan; the action is secondary. In this distinction it's the realist who seems to come out on top, because he believes, along with common sense, in the reality of the act and the actor, the decision and the decision maker. Wonderful! The idealist of course, believing instead in the reality of the plan and especially the ideal plan, looks impractical and absurd. But who is this actor, this hero of the realist philos