Grounding Symbolic Capacity in Robotic Capacity

Depite considerations in favor of symbol grounding, neither pure connectionism nor pure nonsymbolic robotics can be counted out yet, in the path to robotic Turing Test. So far only computationalism and pure AI have fallen by the wayside. If it turns out that no internal symbols at all underlie our symbolic (email Turing Test) capacity, if dynamic states of neural nets alone or sensorimotor mechanisms subserving robotic capacities alone can successfully generate our full robotic performance capacity without symbols, that is still the decisive test for the presence of mind and everyone should be ready to accept the verdict. For even if we should happen to be wrong about such a robot, it is clear that no one (not even an advocate of the stronger neural-equivalence version of the Turing Test, nor even the Blind Watchmaker who designed us but isno more a mind-reader than we are) can ever hope to be the wiser.

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