论文信息 - Direct Demonstration of the Power to Break Public-Key Cryptosystems

Direct Demonstration of the Power to Break Public-Key Cryptosystems

This paper describes a method of proving that a prover (or a crypt-analyst) really knows a secret plaintext or a new code-breaking algorithm for a particular public-key cryptosystem, without revealing any information about the plaintext or algorithm itself. We propose a secure direct protocol which is more efficient than the conventional protocols. This protocol requires only two transmissions between a prover and a verifier. A general form of the secure direct protocol is shown. The explicit forms for the RSA cryptosystem and the discrete logarithm problem are also proposed.

Kenji Koyama

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