Sequential versus Simultaneous Election Contests : An Experimental Study *

This experimental study compares sequential and simultaneous multi-battle election contests. We find substantial evidence of a “New Hampshire effect” in the sequential contests, i.e. the winner of the first battle wins the overall contest with much higher probability than the loser of the first battle. However, contrary to theory, sequential contest generate substantially higher expenditure than simultaneous contest. This is mainly because losers of the first battle do not decrease their expenditure in the second battle; and winners of the first battle substantially increase their expenditure in the second battle, instead of decreasing their expenditure as predicted. We also find that, with repetition of the experiment, subjects learn to behave more in line with equilibrium predictions. However, even in the last periods of the experiment their behavior is substantially different from predictions. JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D72

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