CAN A MACHINE BE CONSCIOUS?1*

'CAN machines think?' is a question which m various forms has been the subject of a great deal of speculation in recent years. Yet the question itself has not been precisely stated. Nor have the issues relevant to the problem it raises been carefully sorted out. As a result, many of the philosophical implications that are supposed to follow from an answer to the question do not follow at all. It is my aim here to indicatejust what issues are, and are not, involved in the machine problem, and what consequences for the philosophy of mind follow if the problem is solved. I shall call the view that machines can be conscious the 'Machine Theory', and refer to the claim that machines cannot be conscious as the 'Anti-Machine Theory '.2 I shall mindicate why, contrary to assumptions implicit especially m the wntmngs of the AntiMachmine Theorists, the claim that machines can be conscious implies comparatively little for mind-body theories, while the claim that machmes cannot be conscious does have consequences which most Anti-Machinme Theorists would find unpalatable. First, it is necessary to reformulate the question 'Can maclunes think?' The fundamental issues at stake in the problem can be brought out more clearly by replacing the term 'thinmk' with the term 'be conscious '. For if we were to demonstrate that a machine could solve