p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics

This paper studies equilibrium selection based on a class of perfect foresight dynamics and relates it to the notion of p-dominance. A continuum of rational players are repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric n n game. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes. The dynamics has stationary states, each of which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the static game. A strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresight dynamics if, independently of the current action distribution, there exists a consistent belief that any player necessarily plays the Nash equilibrium action at every revision opportunity. It is shown that a strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresight dynamics with a small degree of friction if and only if it is the p-dominant equilibrium with p < 1=2. It is also shown that if a strict Nash equilibrium is the p-dominant equilibrium with p < 1=2, then it is uniquely absorbing (and globally accessible) for a small friction (but not vice versa). Set-valued stability concepts are introduced and their existence is shown. Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: C72, C73.