David Makinson and the extension of classical logic

There are two major ways to deal with the limitations of classical logic. It can be replaced by systems representing alternative accounts of the laws of thought (non-classical logic), or it can be supplemented with non-inferential mechanisms. David Makinson has a leading role as proponent of the latter approach in the form of the inferential-preferential method in which classical logic is combined with representations of preference or choice. This has turned out to be a highly efficient and versatile method. Its applications in non-monotonic logic and belief revision are used as examples.

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