Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of Developed and Undeveloped Property1

This article constructs an economic model of government takings in which some property owners develop their land earlier than others. Because it is efficient for the government to “take” undeveloped land before developed land, uncompensated takings will give landowners an incentive to develop their property early in order to reduce the risk of government appropriation. This overdevelopment incentive can be countered, and efficiency thereby restored, if landowners are appropriately compensated when their property is taken, or if “equal treatment” is afforded to owners of developed and undeveloped land. However, when the government responds to political pressure, a judicial compensation requirement will often lead to less government land use regulation than is efficient. In contrast, a judicial equal treatment requirement can elicit efficient development and regulatory decisions.

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